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Abstract
In this piece I ask the question: How has education contributed to the formation or prevention of
nationalism in Germany and Japan? In examining this, after defining the standard conceptions of
nationalism, I apply these definitions to pre-war and post-war Germany and Japan. Ultimately, I
conclude that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that are taught, history
curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to contribute to the rise of
nationalism within a country. Based on these fields, I find that although there are similar
nationalist trends in both countries during the pre-war period, in the post-war period, Germany
has altered these structures to diverge more significantly from its past than Japan.

Key Words
Nationalism, Germany, Japan, Education, Comparative
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Introduction
In the fall of 2017, while watching the Trump presidency begin to unfold, I found myself in a
History of the Holocaust course as social media was already roaring with comparisons between
the new administration and the Third Reich. In fact, the whole globe seemed to be ablaze in
panic as right-wing movements took hold in numerous countries. In particular, the word being
tossed around at the time was nationalism, and at such an intersection, I could not help but pay
attention. The connection between this subject that I was studying in my class and its appearance
in modern discussion was compelling, and I wanted to know more. However, as a broad subject,
I chose to narrow my focus specifically to the connection between nationalism and formal
education extending through higher secondary. As a case study, I examined the two countries I
have been studying most as a student: Germany and Japan.
In doing so, the central question that I asked was: How has education contributed to the
formation or prevention of nationalism in Germany and Japan?
However, this question is easier broken down as:
1) What is nationalism?
2) How did education contribute to the rise of nationalism in pre-war Germany and Japan?
3) How have these categories been witnessed in the modern education system to either
promote or work against the formation of nationalism?
I ultimately find that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that are taught, history
curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to contribute to the rise of
nationalism within a country. Based on this, I find that although there are similar nationalist
trends in both countries during the pre-war period, in the post-war period, Germany has made
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definite strides to steer away from nationalism in these areas, while Japan has at the government
level, struggled to move from pre-war trends, despite meeting some success at the local level.

Literature Review
What is nationalism?
Mostly basically, Merriam-Webster defines nationalism as “a sense of national consciousness
exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture
and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups”, and Britannica
describes an “individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state [that surpasses] other
individual or group interests”. Sivamohan Valluvan emphasizes the role of a defined normative
community that appropriates ideals and platforms to further define its exclusivity and separation
(238). Kersten Rikki, Jack Snyder and Peter Stearns highlight variations in nationalism. Kersten
Rikki discusses current debates in Japan surrounding nationalism and addresses the difference
between the more traditional model of nationalism, which embraces top-down dynamics, and the
neo-nationalist trends, which simultaneously have insisted on the autonomy of the nation from
the state while denouncing post-war democracy for curbing rehabilitated nationalism (193). Jack
Snyder notes the current emphasis on the national over the global along with the idea of citizens
versus non-citizens (54) as he describes the current wave of populist nationalism. Finally, Peter
Stearns discusses not just the development of nationalism along with the nation-state but most
significantly addresses the various contexts of nationalism. For example, he contrasts cultural
and political nationalisms, dominant versus liberal nationalisms, various approaches to
minorities, civic versus ethnic based nationalism and more. All of these contributors highlight
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the complexity of nationalism. However, in order to examine nationalism in this research, both
Jack Snyder and Peter Stearns acknowledge this complexity, and similar to the dictionary
definitions, bring nationalism back to its basics. Jack Snyder notes that nationalism is a doctrine
in which there is a general consensus “that the cultural unity of the nation, whether defined along
civic or ethnic lines, should be congruent with the political unit of the state” (54), and Peter
Stearns draws attention to the common ground that is met by various breeds and intensities of
nationalism, which involves “a special consciousness of and loyalty to a nation, in turn defined
as a distinctive entity in which people in a particular geographical region are held to be united by
a common culture” (62). To dismantle the definitions then, nationalism typically consists of an
elevation of state over the individual, to which the individual is loyal/expected to be loyal, and
the definition of said state through various means, typically including common location and
elevation/promotion of a shared culture.
How did education contribute to the rise of nationalism in pre-war Germany and Japan?
Based on the above definitions of nationalism then, in my research on education in Germany and
Japan, there seemed to be four primary categories related to its development in the pre-war years:
the overall goal of education, the formation or definition of a unified national identity, the
manipulation or mythologizing of history, and the control of education by the state.
Masako Shibata, in her research on the reform of nationalized education systems in the
post-war period, defines the primary goals of education leading up to World War II. For
example, Mori Arinori, founder of the modern Japanese educational system, viewed “the
ultimate aim of education [as] the key of attaining and maintaining national independence” (78).
Indeed, as Donald Roden explains, even before Mori became the first Minister of Education, the
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1872 Educational Code assumed that in stimulating the individual to improve his economic
welfare and societal position, that the nation would itself be strengthened (21). Therefore, the
universalization of the education system was not simply to provide opportunity to the citizens of
the country, but to promote the advancement of the state itself. This was furthered through
various means, with this intention ultimately being solidified and strengthened by the 1890
Imperial Rescript on Education, which according to Ian Buruma, defined state education
principles, emphasizing loyalty to the nation (56). Shibata touches on this as well, noting the
maintenance of virtues of the state as subjects of the emperor (Shibata 79). Despite this, Mark
Lincicome discusses some historic variations to this view on the role of education, such as
Tokutomi Sohō, who argued that education should be rooted in the nature of humanity to
cultivate the individual (343); however, even Lincicome concedes that ultimately these variations
folded due to the widespread acceptance of Japanese superiority as well as mounting government
pressures, so that education ultimately prevailed as a tool for the state (357).
These purposes only intensified to become more ultra-nationalistic after 1932, as
Yoshimitsu Khan describes the goals of education during the early Showa era to be the training
of youth in ‘Japanism’ and the “spirit of national polity in order to serve the ‘race’ and ‘state’
(213). At its peak, he explains, ‘Japanism’ involved mysticism, anti-rationalism, anti-foreignism,
anti-communism, and anti-socialism in order to foster support for Imperialist Japan (219). This
was further enhanced in 1936, as the purpose of education became more explicitly to emphasize
the role of Japanese citizens as part of a nation (through the Way of the Subjects) and the
spiritual enhancement of students to encourage “[loyalty and patriotism] in the military
nation”(215). In 1937 and 1938 as well, the structure changed in order to support the nation,
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specifically their war efforts, and routine physical examinations were conducted to ensure
military preparedness (220). Ultimately, Khan notes, “[t]he goal was to grow & harvest people
who would dedicate mind and soul to the cause of the war”(218).
Similar goals existed developed within Germany. Prior to the political consolidation of
the German state in 1871, Masako Shibata stresses significant strides toward cultural cohesion,
which were attempted as official statehood through governmental means seemed far-off (80).
Due to this legacy, Shibata argues that the key political agenda after the formation of the German
nation-state was the maintenance of unification through “retention of the socio-cultural traditions
of the German domains”(80). This was enacted largely as the Kasierreich’ s educational policy
developed a political tool out of the long respected tradition of education within the German
states (84). Lisa Pine details the expansion of this concept and discusses how national education
developed into an institutionalized a force designed to instill an attitude of submission to
authority and the state (7). She notes that this trend continued over decades into the Weimar
Republic, as Otto Boelitz, Prussian Minister of Education between 1921 and 1925 viewed the
primary goal of education to be “the renewal of national power and unity” (10). This naturally
carried into the Third Reich, as education became even more explicitly to educate a young
German population who would be dedicated to service and sacrifice for the state (23).
Therefore, it is clear that both in Japan and Germany, education was viewed and
constructed first and foremost for the good of and the strengthening of the state, and this concept
developed overtime to be increasingly nationalistic.
In regard to the formation of national identity or a national ideal, Masako Shibata simply
states, “In Meiji Japan (1868-1912) and the German Kaiserreich (1871-1918), the educational
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system assisted the state in the definition of the notions of national identity” (75). In regards to
Japan, Shibata notes an abrupt formation of national identity following the arrival of Commodore
Perry, that was later solidified and stressed through educational means. She writes that the “key
role of primary education was to ensure that all Japanese would share the same sense of national
identity, and unify the Japanese within the new ideological framework of the Emperor State”
(79). Shibata, along with Michael Hoffman and Obe Misuru, also references the inclusion of
Moral Education in Japanese curriculum, which essentially embedded state ideology (Shibata 79)
and sociocultural values into all educational practice (20). This included the promotion of
Confucian values at the center of the national identity and situated each individual within the
larger system of piety (76). Tetsuya Kobayashi confirms this trend, commenting, “Confucianism
[functioned in the field of education] as a completely secular instruction in literature, ethics, and
history or political science in the present state of these words” (13). Hoffman contributes to the
understanding of Moral Education also by providing an example of the 1890 Imperial Rescript
on Education, which exhorted children to give themselves to the state (1). In addition, Ian Gibson
notes the role of State-Shinto in this, in which he claims “a powerful spiritual belief (national
Shintoism) [is linked] with a powerful spiritual presence (the emperor)” (108). This stemmed
largely from the mythologized idea of Japan’s past, which viewed Japan as a family under the
emperor, obeying the Imperial Will (110). This trend in particular was increasingly emphasized
as the nationalism became more ultra-nationalistic in the 1930s. For example, Yoshimitsu Khan
references The Principles of the National Polity issued in 1937, which includes emphasis on the
Japanese people as descendents of the Emperor, who is himself considered son of the Sun
Goddess Amaterasu. Under the emperor then, similar to as Gibson notes, Japan is regarded as a
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family-state and is expected to pay loyalty to their divine emperor (Khan 215, 220). Therefore,
the formation of national identity seems to be for the achievement of unity as a nation with the
same central goals, in particular for the promotion of subordination to the Japanese state. This
relates to the definitions of nationalism which focus on the emphasis of the collective nation and
undermining of the individual.
A similar structure of national identity formation existed in the German education system
during the pre-war period. As already established, Shibata asserts that education was used largely
to consolidate state formation through cultural unity; therefore, the concept of national identity
has been central to German education since its emergence as a state. She explains that before the
consolidation of a political nation, “the nation of Germany existed within the consciousness of
the people in the German cultural domains”, and that these early efforts toward cohesion were
carefully preserved post-1871 in education to maintain said unity (80). Specifically, Shibata
describes the education of the Kaiserreich as centered around national identity elements such as
cultural orientations and values (84), which “[were] consolidated around indigenous elements of
Kultur, Volk and Christianity” (82). In particular, religion, German, and “traditional moral
disciplines” were emphasized in curricula (84). Louis L. Schnyder describes national identity
around these traditional cultural lines also, speaking of mythologized heroes from national and
imperial legends, some of which were taught regularly to schoolchildren, functioning, according
to Schnyder, to develop a new hope for the nation (185). InesAnna Guhe expands on this, and
illustrates how Crusade narratives in textbooks included historical figures to cultivate an image
considered/desired to be characteristic of the nation-a collective ideal (369-370). Notably,
Germany's national identity was actively exclusionary at this time. As Schnyder implies, this was
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a largely reactionary movement against enlightenment principles imposed by the outsider
Napoleon, as the Germans sought to find “that ‘freedom’ which had little in common with
French and English egalitarianism” (59). In doing so, they looked to “their own idea of an
organic folk community wrapped in the cloak of tradition” (59). Lisa Pine notes that these
restrictive definitions of national characteristics and community developed within education to
increasingly exclude Jewish cultural influences, which were considered foreign (53). However, it
was with the rise of the Third Reich that these exclusionary measures became most extreme, as
so-called racial studies were taught to define by “biology”, as well as by other means, the
differences between the accepted German “Aryan” identity and Jewish identity (56-60).
Therefore, such definitions of national identity were not only used to unite the nation, but
specifically to define its constituents or “in-group”. In addition to this, Pine notes that the girls
and boys’ education differed to define gendered ideals at the sub-level of national identity (60).
This was expanded within the increasingly emphasized Bund Deutscher Mädel and Hitler
Jugend, which constructed the roles of men and women around the needs of the state (95-132).
This too falls in line with the overall trends regarding national identity then, which among other
things, Louis L. Schnyder explains as, the German mind [] molded around the rejection of
individualism and the acceptance of exaltation of the state (225).
In both Japan and Germany then, education was used to foster a concept of national
identity and national ideal, the likes of which was used to promote the idea of the nation, define
the exclusivity of the nation, and to unite the members of the nation around ideals for the
advancement of the nation.
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In examining the next two categories of history and control of education in relation to
nationalism, Jahyun Chun writes, “[Those with the power to define history are] able to adjust
perceptions of history while presenting the direction that the nation should take,” and it is
through the definition of histories “that people have come to shape certain emotions regarding
one’s homeland or a foreign country (569).” In doing so, Chun implies the significance of both
categories in regard to nationalism.
In relation to history, in reference to Japan, Masako Shibata and Ian Buruma both explain
how the government stressed the past as a national myth with “a people with common ancestry
headed by the Emperor, a direct descendant of the unbroken imperial lineage”(Shibata 76), the
likes of which were connected to the divine (Buruma 191). This continued to be prominently
taught into the Showa era (Khan 220). Chun, in discussing modern Japanese textbooks,
highlights a historical trend for Japanese history to be portrayed through a “strictly empiricist
historiography” that focuses less on deep analysis of events, but rather on a retelling of an
official narrative of history (570-571). These findings suggest an emphasis on the legacy of
Japan, which in relation to Chun’s original statement, could easily connect to the promotion of
advancement, national preservation, and imperialism. In addition, the emphasis on the divine
lineage could be construed to assert Japanese superiority, justifying these imperialistic goals and
rationalizing the subjugation of the people. This falls in line heavily with how Khan describes
history education to have developed during the intensified war period, with history contributing
to the larger branch of ‘National Studies’, which consolidated the subjects of foreign language,
history, and geography around the national spirit and promotion of the imperial state (222). This
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included a clear mythologization of history (216) and the restriction of factual content only to
what was considered useful to the state (222).
In Germany, Chun implies a similar historical tendency for history to be portrayed along
a “grand national narrative” (570). Guhe explains this to be chronologically done (370). In her
study on the portrayal of the Crusades in history, she writes “[National history] consisted of
drastically modified narratives of the ‘fictitious early period of the nation’ through to its
fulfillment in The Reich of 1871” (369). History, by her account, was constructed along narrative
lines to legitimize and glorify the current German nation and promote its furtherment. She also
notes an increased shift from 1871 onward to focus more on the history of the nation than on
world history (369). This could be interpreted to not only promote the formation of a national
identity but also to advocate the continued development of the nation. Guhe addresses this
concept as she writes of the ability for national history/mythology to “refer to the future whilst
recounting past events, thus forming a certain continuum” which would, similar to Chun’s
argument, in its construction of reality be used to propagate certain ideas, values, and
constructions of national meaning and purpose (369). Guhe continually refers to narratives of the
Crusades as an example of this (369). Lisa Pine contributes to this also, citing how history texts
were “intended to awaken and excite children’s sense of national pride and concern about the
continued existence of the German state and nation” (50). She notes in particular an emphasis on
great leaders and historical figures, in particular their “‘world historical’ achievements” (50).
Specific to Germany, however, was also the use of history books to create narratives of German
suffering due to the Jewish people, which was then used to increase loyalty to the state and
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promote the German “struggle” against the “Jewish enemy” (51). In this sense then, history was
used to strengthens definitions and development of national ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups.
Relating to the education of history is the centralization of education policy within the
government. In reference to Japan, Shibata details how the Meiji government established the
Ministry of Education in 1871 with Mori Arinori himself serving as the first Minister of
Education. It was through such an institution that the Fundamental Code of Education was
enacted in 1872, through which “the government shaped the institutional keystone of the modern
education system (78). Shibata also discusses the invaluable role of the universalization of
education, built upon an already solid education foundation, in achieving the earlier mentioned
goals of unity (78-79). As education expanded she explains, so did the control of it through state
bureaucracy, through which the government instituted their views and policies on curriculum,
inclusion of moral education, concentration on the imperial dynasty and more (79). In this way,
Shibata connects control to dissemination of ideology. Roden expands on education under the
centralized control of the Ministry of Education. In his discussion on pre-war education, Roden
notes “a series of important ordinances issued in spring of 1886” which “clarified the purposes of
each level of the school system in terms” (39). Even the prestigious higher schools were under
the influence of the Ministry of Education (73). By noting these things, Roden indicates a control
of education that was not distant, but rather one that reached into various facets of the system.
Kobayashi elaborates on all of this discussion, describing the structure of the education system
all under the Ministry of Education as well as the Fundamental Code of Education. He describes
also that “The Ministry prepared the course of study for the elementary schools, a recommended
list of textbooks, and subsidized local government” (25), suggesting a more pervasive control of
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education similar to Roden. Kobayashi also includes in his research the establishment of normal
schools, six of which were set up in various provinces to train teachers, as well as eighty-two
teacher training schools, which were set up by local governments for the specific training of
teachers (26). He notes a short period of liberal progression, but maintains that this movement,
only reaching a handful of private schools, did not last nor did it extend a significant influence to
deter these nationally structured policies and aims (30).
In the early Showa period, as Khan explains, state control became especially pronounced.
After the May 15th Incident of 1932, militarism began to influence politics more strongly, which
necessarily included the Ministry of Education (217). In 1937, the Education Reform Council
expressed the unity of religion, politics, and teaching (215), and throughout this time, control of
teachers (218), schools, and textbooks continued to centralize (215). Also in 1937, the Thought
Control Department within the Ministry of Education changed its name to the Educational
Affairs Bureau as it concentrated its efforts largely to the supervision and control of the
ideological development of students (214-215). In doing so, liberalism was enthusiastically
undermined and concepts such as national essence continued to be emphasized. In 1941 this
trend continued into the National School Ordinance Enforcement Regulation, which in its
policies further promoted imperialist education, national empowerment, and glorification of
national culture both in school and at home (221). Therefore, as nationalism progressively
became more extreme in pre-war Japan, the control of education intensified.
In regard to Germany, Masako Shibata mentions the strong political groundwork of the
school system (84); however, it is Pine who most thoroughly discusses the education system and
its purposes. She first speaks of the Stiehl Ordinance in 1854, which standardized the curriculum
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of the early Volksbildung as well as the training of teachers, even before national unification (7).
According to Pine, “because [this standardization stymied the attempts of educational reformers]
the state played a much larger role in the content of mass education than in previous decades”
(7). With this, Pine asserts that by the time Germany was politically unified,
“Volksbildung[ ...]had become institutionalised as a force for inculcating in the common people
an attitude of submission to authority and state” (7). She notes also that there was an overall
trend in society toward “the militarization of everyday life” which “created an emphasis on
hierarchy and obedience to authority” (8).  Pine also discusses the expansion of compulsory
schooling (9), along with the expansion of state control. She explains how the Ministry of
Education, holding among other things, centralized control over the appointment of teachers, was
increasingly infringed upon by other areas of the government and the NSDAP (21) and how as
the 1930s continued, the state progressively centralized control. In January 1934, “A
law[...]removed the autonomy of the Laender ( states) in order to achieve centralized state control
over education” (27). The Nazi party at this time also eliminated various democratic elements of
the school systems, such as parents councils and other community roles (27). In addition to this,
to further consolidate the state control and shaping of education, Pine notes the
Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund, which, similar to in Japan, “sought to produce a different
breed of teachers in the Third Reich and to train them in accordance with his own educational
imperatives for German society” (13). The organization, although on the decline from 1935 until
its closure in 1943, was established in 1929 as a means to 1) “provide reports on the political
reliability of teachers for appointments and promotions” and 2) “ensure the ideological
indoctrination of teachers” (15). Although it was just for a short while, in this way, the teachers

Vrtiska 17

too faced state regulation in order to ensure even further centralization and control of education,
the likes of which worked to increase ease of ideological dissemination.
Through both Japan and Germany therefore, it becomes clear that the centralization of
education existed in both countries and functioned in the hands of the state to further
nationalistic goals such as the promotion of state ideology and subordination of the individual to
the state.
How can these categories be witnessed in the modern education systems of both countries
to either promote or work against the formation of nationalism?
Germany
When examining how the goals of education have shifted in Germany after the war, Inari Sakki
and Anna Maija Pirttilä-Backman note that the national goals of teaching history at least, have
shifted toward “issues related to both multi-perspectivity and identity”(71), and comment that the
subjects related to identity are carefully handled. The objectives themselves “show no sign of a
return to a national German history, but the topics related to Germany are placed within general
European and world contexts” (71). In addition to this, Brian M. Puaca describes the school
reform in West Berlin, reforms which he cites as being exemplary for the nation (247). In his
report, he highlights a notable set of guidelines by Carl Heinz Evers. According to Puaca, Evers
saw the goal of political education-the classification for the reforms-to be “to instill a sense of
responsibility in every pupil and at the same time provide lessons in citizenship applicable to all
aspects of life in a democratic society” (259). Therefore, the goals have seemingly shifted from
focusing on the advancement of the nation and subordination of the individual to the cultivation
of a democratically competent individual.
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In regards to identity, this same idea of Evers about a sense of responsibility and
citizenship linked to democratic society remains somewhat applicable (259), as he indicates a
transition from the formation of a homogeneous national identity to the cultivation of the
individual within the nation. Another aspect that seems to be related to national identity is
expressed in Jahyun Chun’s study on memories of colonization and war in history textbooks. He
describes how the focus on war and colonization in German textbooks is part of “a gradual
process to increase awareness of the entire country’s responsibility” (569). Notably, he classifies
“[such] national incidents [as having] a tremendous impact on forming a country’s identity”
(569). Rosa-Maria Ndolo suggests a similar construction through education in her article on
national identity and collective memory. She notes that although students are never taught that
they are directly guilty or responsible for the crimes of their ancestors, from an early age students
learn to associate Germany with its Nazi past (62). This is somewhat reminiscent of Masako
Shibata’s description of Eduard Spranger’s view on national identity in the midst of the post-war
education reforms, in which he spoke not of teaching people Germanness, but of “educating
people in the consciousness of being a German”(122). Buruma notes this transition of national
identity as well, commenting that “[s]choolchildren are no longer asked to identify with flags,
songs, and heroes, or a carefully constructed sense of historical continuity”(185). He describes
this as the lack of the “symbolism of national identity”(185). However, elsewhere in his book,
Buruma notes two features prevalent in German education that speaks somewhat to national
identity: resistance, as seen through inclusion of resistance heroes (186, 188) and pacifism (25).
Therefore, although Germany as mentioned before, seems to lack an explicit promotion of a
unified national identity, especially the lack of a developing heroic legacy or model of its ideal
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citizen, through education trends seem to have emerged that signal a new German identity
framed around its guilt. In this way, it seems to not necessarily be nationalistic in the sense of an
exaltation of the country, but it does suggest a cohesiveness of sorts.
Closely linked to national identity is, of course, history. Jahyun Chun describes the
general shift in the handling of history well, as he notes that “German portrayals shifted from a
grand national narrative to a more analytical, social-scientific historiography” (571). In line with
this, Puaca mentions in his study on education reform increased inclusion of opportunities for
discussion and debate (246), suggesting a shift from the very rigid dissemination of a past
narrative to a discussion of history that seeks analysis and understanding, as described by Chun.
Perhaps most significant is the inclusion and emphasis by Germany on its dark past. Buruma,
Chun, Felix Philipp Lutz (who did a study on historical consciousness in Germany), and Puaca
all consider Germany’s focus on its darker past in its history noteable, as the country includes
clear explanation of the Nazi atrocities, the Holocaust, and more in the curricula of all its young
students (Buruma 149, Chun 579, Lutz 55, Puaca 252). In addition, as mentioned above, Buruma
notes the inclusion of resistance heroes in Germany’s history curricula (186).
Besides these general themes discussed in regard to German history, Wolfgang Geiger
summarizes a presentation by Unsuk Han that was given as part of a conference in reflection on
global history perspectives in history. In the presentation, Han finds that although textbooks in
Korea tend to include a large percentage of European history, German textbooks were containing
an average of 3% Asian history (1). The report ultimately recommends including higher levels of
global perspectives in history (‘Big History’) in its Germany’s description of the past, the likes of
which Germany seems to be somewhat weak on (1). However, Inari Sakki and Anna-Maija
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Pirttilä-Backman suggest improvement in such fields compared to in the nation’s past, claiming
that “topics related to Germany are placed within general European and world contexts” (71).
Chun seems to indicate the same, as he highlights trends in textbooks to not assert national myths
or ideas of nationhood, but rather to “allow European and world history the same curriculum
time as Germany’s national history” (580). He also notes a smaller focus on national history, the
likes of which when included, center on contemporary history, particularly 20th century history,
rather than glorified pasts (580). Despite this, Han’s findings at least suggest a focus on Europe,
which could potentially relate to an emphasis on an increasingly united Europe. In summary
then, history seems to have shifted from glorious, romanticized views of the past to analytical,
multi-perspective looks at both the good and the bad that seek not only to know, but to deeply
understand Germany’s past. The goal then appears to be directed away from elevation or
allegiance to state, as had been the trend in the pre-war period. In addition, although there is a
shift from an overly national approach to history, there seemingly remains a concentration on
Europe.
Lastly, in relation to control of education, Inari Sakki and Anna-Maija Pirttilä-Backman
describe how “each of [Germany’s] sixteen state governments (Laender) makes decisions about
its own curriculum” (71), while the Conference of Ministers of Education is able to formulate
recommendations for “a national approach to educational issues” (71). Jahyun Chun discusses
this decentralization further in his study on textbooks, and notes minimal state intervention in the
writing of textbooks, instead relying on teachers-who “dominate[] the creation of curricula and
textbooks based on their strong claim to professionalism”-and institutions such as the
Georg-Eckert Institute for Textbook Research, which assists in forming curricula and that even
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“initiated the set-up of a textbook commission with other countries” (581). Brian M. Puaca adds
to this, discussing how democratization reform was done at the local level and that grassroot
efforts by teachers were eventually standardized (246), which highlights early control at the local
level. In addition to just an overhaul of the structure, Puaca notes how schools were structured to
encourage the further democratization of society, even the relationship between the students and
teachers shifting from one of control to respect (260. 264). In this way, it appears that schools
were not only decentralized to begin with, but were structured to encourage further prevention of
consolidated state power. In his research, Puaca also describes several of the guidelines that held
a heavy influence in Berlin (considered to be exemplary to other states), such as those by
Joachim Tibertius and Carl-Heinz Evers. The outlines, as discussed briefly earlier, suggest
curricula at each school level such as themes to cover in each school year (250-252). Puaca
seems to suggest widespread incorporation, but qualifies this by explaining how teachers then
were able to try out the guidelines at their own will, make alterations and suggest improvements
to them, and ultimately reform the guidelines to best suit the classrooms (256-257). Therefore,
through both the development of textbooks themselves, as well as the specific curricula and
manner of teaching, there appears to be a large decentralization in education that puts education
in the hands of educators-not politicians, thereby preventing state manipulation of education.
Japan
In post-war Japan, the development of goals of education has been significant. As Ian Gibson
explains in his tracing of the post-war education reform, during the initial post-war occupation
period, the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education was established which detailed the basic right
of every citizen to education in Japan. As such, education was framed as a right rather than a
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duty, as well as a freedom and an expression of individualism rather than an issue of control and
conformity (111). Tetsuya Kobayashi elaborates on this as he examines the changing education
system in Japan, noting that the law followed the general spirit of the Constitution, particularly in
its emphasis on education as an equal opportunity and freedom (55). He describes that initially,
the goals surrounding education were nearly universal (58-59). However, Kobayashi notes a
shift in goals as he stresses the long-standing power of the Liberal-Democratic Party, whose
handling of education can be summarized by 1) a regard for “education as a political tool for
national solidarity and stability” 2) the development of education as a means of economic and
industrial development and 3) the strengthening leadership of the central government in
education (68). Ian Gibson follows this shift, paying attention to how the Nakasone Model in the
eighties stated its goals to be to encourage patriotism and filial piety among students (113). He
also notes, similar to Kobayashi, an increased focus on bolstering the economy through
education (113). Most notably however, Gibson demonstrates this change in goals as he
describes the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito Party’s revision of the Fundamental
Law of Education in 2006. The revision was the first since its creation and includes that
“student’s cultivate ‘an attitude that respects tradition and culture and love of the national
homeland that has fostered them’”(113). Mitsuru Obe reiterates this, noting that “[l]ove for the
nation and respect for its traditions and culture were established as official goals of the Japanese
education system”(1), indicating a clear refocusing of the goals of education to the cultivation of
the country and national unity rather than solely the individual. Despite this, Kobayashi argues
that these goals are not shared nation-wide, as many teachers disagree and are unhappy with the
stated goals (104). In addition, Kobayashi notes a tradition for education to be met with zeal
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among participants, as its viewed as a method for personal advancement (107). Therefore, there
exists simultaneous goals of personal cultivation at the local level and development for the nation
at the government level, the latter being more similar to the pre-war nationalistic goals.
In regard to national identity, there seems to be more concrete trends of shaping national
identity than in Germany. For example, Kobayashi notes an early attempt at this in 1966 with the
issuing by the Central Council for Education of “The Image of the Ideal Japanese”, which listed
sixteen qualities related to their cultivation of character as an individual, member of the family,
member of society, and as a national of Japan” (63). Included in the ideals related to being a
national are a sense of patriotism, a respect for the symbol of the state, and “excellent national
characteristics” (63); however, other ideals listed throughout the document range from personal
development, having a strong will, and an emphasis on education at home, to devotion to work
and social welfare, societal norms, and more (63). This explicit outlining of the ‘ideal Japanese’
is a clear attempt at the formation of a national identity, the likes of which could potentially be
used to describe accepted ‘in’ groups and ‘out’ groups in addition to promoting subordination to
the collective state. Another example of this is argued by Ian Gibson, as he discusses the
international education movement under the Nakasone education model in the eighties. He
explains that although the movement might initially look harmless or progressive, the rhetoric
surrounding the it “encapsulated the dominant nationalistic view of kokusaika [international
studies] as the preservation of Japanese economic power, identity, and national unity” (113). It
was, he argues, more about defining and protecting cultural barriers rather than transcending
them (113). Lincicome makes reference to this movement as well in his explanation of the
pre-war internationalization movement which sought to establish Japan as a dominant power,
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arguing that the two movements are highly similar in nature (357). Therefore, although not
specifically about curricula, education is implied to be manipulated once again in order to protect
a specific identity of the nation. In addition to discussion of the international education
movement as part of national identity formation in education however, Gibson also discusses the
introduction of the wartime symbols of Kimigayo and Hinomaru ( the national anthem and
standing for the national flag) in schools (114). Ian Buruma discusses this too, drawing parallels
to the pre-war years (200). Together, both contributors emphasize its controversy as a symbol,
consistently debated between being either an image of patriotism for Japan or indoctrination
related to national unity/love for country (Buruma, 200, Gibson, 114).
Perhaps most central as of late to the debate surrounding national identity formation
within education is the reinstatement of moral education within Japanese curricula. The Ministry
of Education outlines Moral Education on their website and states its general purpose:
“Moral education aims to develop a Japanese citizen who will never lose the
consistent spirit of respect for his fellow man; who will realize this spirit at home, at
school and in other actural life situations in the society of which he is a member; who
strives for the creation of a culture rich in individuality and for the development of a
democratic nation and society; and who is able to make a voluntary contribution to the
peaceful international society.” (Ministry of Education, 1).
The subject of Moral Education has existed for a long time in Japan. Kobayashi describes its
early post-war development in a wide-variety of subjects as a means to promote a proper
understanding and affection for Japan and its culture. Kobayashi argues that “These new
directions in moral education and the teaching of history and geography emphasized national
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identity and clearly indicated a shift in the aim of national education from universalism to
particularism or nationalism” (61). Michael Hoffman and Obe Mitsuru discuss its further
development. Hoffman notes its 2018 transformation from a gradeless topic with informal
lessons into a nationwide official school subject. He argues that despite its divergence from
pre-war severity, the idea of a class with grades and curricula is in itself troubling (1). Obe
discusses this further, noting that as part of this education initiative, new classes will feature
textbooks which previously did not exist as part of the post-war moral education. The new books
incorporate the earlier mentioned guidelines for education (1). Due to this development, Obe
references rising fears, particularly among the more liberal Teachers Union who assert that
Moral Education forces values on students (1). Despite this, Obe admits that a large portion of
Japanese support the general idea of ethics education (1). Therefore, although the topic is
debated, moral education seems to be developing from a simple promotion of cooperative values
to a more prominent instillation of ideas about national identity into its students through official
curricula.
Finally, both Ian Buruma and Martin Fackler, in their discussions on post-war textbooks,
note the emphasis on Japan being an anti-war, nation of peace (Buruma 104, Fackler 1). Buruma
in particular links this to the Peace Education Movement, which he argues, in examining the
horrors of the past, mines out a message of world peace, with Japan serving as its symbol (104).
Due to this, both Buruma and Inuzuka postulate that Japan cultivates its identity more around
that of a victim than an aggressor (Buruma 93-94, 98-99, Inuzuka 143), the likes of which
although good in nature, could be seen to ignore harder aspects of Japan’s history in order to
promote a greater affection toward the nation.
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In general then, there appears to be definite trends toward the promotion of a national
identity or national unification, as well as a certain level of dedication or love for the country;
however, protests at the local level may call the success of such goals to question.
One of the most controversial aspects of Japan’s education system is its handling of
history. In particular, the subject of textbooks comes up repeatedly in relation to Japan. Jahyun
Chun describes the history in textbooks most basically, explaining that the empiricist
historiography was largely retained in Japan, as history is taught with little focus on cause and
effect (570). Kazuya Fukuoka notes this too in his study on historical memory in Japan.
Although he ultimately emphasizes the importance of other factors and memory devices besides
merely textbooks, he describes the history presented in most textbooks, based on his own
examination and corroborating interviews with students, as shallow, with little emphasis on
cause/effect (91). As a part of this, he also notes a relatively even distribution between subjects,
with each subject, no matter the nature, receiving a similar amount of attention in the textbooks
(91). This trend also extends to controversial subjects. As Jahyun Chun (574-575) and Ako
Inuzuka (136, 138) argue, when controversial topics such as comfort women are included, the
topics are covered vaguely. Chun argues that not only is information on the colonized and
marginalized rarely included (574), but when it is, euphemisms, unclear wording, and other
attempts to avoid negative descriptions of the events are prevalent (574-575). In his study, he
explains that this is not just in certain, random textbooks that this occurs, rather he traces these
patterns in even the three most popular textbooks in Japan at the time (circa 2006) (575). Inuzuka
confirms this, arguing that even the more critical textbooks are often vague in their descriptions
(138). Inuzuka also connects this vagueness to the ongoing controversy surrounding Japan’s
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collective memory during the war, which he claims “shapes and reshapes history as myth” (134).
As an example of this, Inuzuka examines the infamous Fusosha textbook, which he concludes
goes so far as to glorify the Japanese military past (143). Ian Buruma mentions this ongoing
debate surrounding textbooks as well, explaining the movement as back and forth ‘reforms’ to
history curricula that come by means of “purging textbooks of all facts that might stand in the
way of healthy patriotic pride” (xii). In textbooks alone then, there is a clear attempt to
whitewash Japan’s history, which could be seen to somewhat mythologize Japan’s past in some
rare cases through glorification of its military, and in more frequent cases, by avoiding its
wrongdoing.
In addition to the role of textbooks in history education however, Fukuoka and Gibson
both comment on the influence of the high intensity exam system in Japan. Both of them argue
that the focus on test-taking curbs space for critical discussion of historical subjects in classroom,
which contributes to a shallow discussion and education of critical topics (Fukuoka 91, Gibson
115). In doing so, schools avoid looking critically at what led to incidents of the past. In addition,
Fukuoka in his research observes how the examinations shape the curriculum focused on in
class. He asserts that subjects not stressed in the exams are subsequently not stressed in
classroom. This becomes particularly significant as exams tend to focus on pre-modern history,
skipping largely over modern history (91). In turn, even outside of textbooks, the subject of
Japan’s military history and controversial role in the war tends to be avoided. In addition to this,
because the emphasis is placed on pre-modern history, the focus of history appears to remain
largely Japan-centric.
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However, in discussions related to history education in Japan, the role of teachers is
essential because as Buruma, Kobayashi, and Gibson note, there is a conflict between the
conservative Ministry of Education/government and the generally more liberal teachers, in
particular the Teachers Union (Buruma xii, Gibson 111, Kobayashi 160). For example, the most
controversial of textbooks, which at times are known to glorify Japan’s military past, are rarely
adopted by teachers in classrooms (Fukuoka 86, Gibson 115). In addition, Fukuoka emphasizes
the importance of the views of the teachers themselves, some conservative, but many, liberal and
more intent on teaching about Japan’s past (94). However, he also notes that due to the
controversy surrounding said subjects, they have been known to be skipped over or avoided to
bypass awkwardness (94). Included in this are many teachers who are proponents of Peace
Education (94), which Buruma cites too as a popular branch of history education (98). However,
as mentioned earlier, Buruma and Ako Inuzuka both suggest that there is oftentimes a trend,
even in Peace Education, to view Japan more prominently in the role of victim rather than
aggressor (Buruma 93-94, 98-99, Inuzuka 143). This could also suggest the preference of one
history over another, which in turn also downplays or pushes out the darker elements of Japan’s
past. Through these various elements then, it becomes clear that the history taught in the
classroom is not bound to what gets included in textbooks, instead, teachers have the power to
elaborate on the more controversial subjects of Japan’s past and in doing so, have the power to
counter nationalistic aims that might be otherwise promoted. However, certain trends or policies
backed by teachers could also serve to further direct emphasis on certain historical narratives
over others.
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The subject of control of education is heavily related to history education in Japan.
During the occupation period, both Gibson and Shibata assert that the precedent for continued
centralized control of education was set by the Americans, who used the Ministry of Education
to their advantage in their attempted reforms (Gibson 111, Shibata 84). Kobayashi elaborates on
this early centralization, explaining the Ministry’s control as detailed in the 1948 Board of
Education Law and the 1949 Ministry of Education Establishment Law, which note the
Ministry’s authority over conducting studies and laying out plans for the promotion of education,
as well as its ability to set standards in regard to structure, conditions of schooling, and content in
curriculum (71). Both Kobayashi and Gibson argue however, that the primary seizure of control
came shortly after the occupation period with the Liberal-Democratic Party's 1958 amendments
to the Enforcement Regulations for the School Education Act (Gibson 112, Kobayashi 71-72)
which set that curriculum in public schools must meet the standards of the Ministry (72, 125).
Gibson relates this to not only to the control over Moral Education (112), but adds that “[b]y
1961 a system of teacher appraisal had been established along with textbook screening, an
achievement test to measure children’s progress and the nomination-as opposed to election-of
administrative staff to local Boards of Education” (112). Buruma cites this also as an example of
the government seizure of control (192). Throughout this time, as well as nearly consistently into
present day, these policies have been in the hands of the same Liberal-Democratic Party, who as
mentioned previously, have been increasingly characterized by their attempts to strengthen the
government's role in education (Buruma 10, Kobayashi 68).
Most central to the conversation around government control of education however, is the
discussion around the censorship of textbooks. Ako Inuzuka discusses the history and
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development of textbook screenings in Japan with a special focus on the controversial Fusosha
textbook. He details how prior to release, all textbooks must pass through the Ministry, many
being sent back with revisions before they can be published (134). He asserts that historically
textbooks have softened historical events due to the watchful eye of the Ministry, which
frequently flags books considered a threat to patriotism (135). He notes other often censored
content such as anti-patriarchal or socialist ideas (135). Ultimately, he argues that “[c]urrent
textbook screening in Japan does not only present a hurdle for those who demand historic
‘accuracy’ for their own texts, it also presents a gate for nationalist, revisionist tendencies
whenever they are in line with the conservative forces that run the country” (145). Chun agrees
with Gibson in his analysis of textbooks (574, 581). He also details the screening process, and
states that the final format and content of each book is in the hands of the Ministry of Education
(574). However, Chun also includes the curriculum guidelines laid out by the Ministry which
detail “what content is to be placed in each book” (574), which is “made possible through the
Fundamentals of Education Act” (574). This relates to an earlier description by him of textbooks
as they relate to collective memory, as officially selected knowledge (571), the knowledge
placed in the textbooks here being officially s elected by the government, which he specifically
links this to the strengthening of nationalistic ideology in Japan (574).
In addition to Inuzuka and Chun, Buruma (192), Gibson (114), and Fukuoka (85) all
make clear the height of the controversy regarding said policies. However, in addition to control
of textbooks, Buruma (200) and Gibson (114) note the government's use of authority to reinstate
the national anthem Kimigayo and national flag Hinomaru into schools, along with the
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subsequent protests against them. Many argue that their reinstatement is too close to pre-war
nationalism and attempts to foster allegiance to the state (114).
The reactions against this are reminiscent on some of the other checks to the governments
centralized control. Buruma for example, notes how in the Fundamental Law of Education,
textbooks, although screened by the government, are allowed to be selected by the schools
themselves, not the government (191). Fukuoka references this in his argument against the panic
toward controversial textbooks, stating that such controversial books are rarely adopted by
schools (86). This is similar to Kobayashi’s note that private schools have more freedom in their
curriculum requirements than public schools (125), which denotes an alternative to more heavily
government controlled education. In addition to also commenting on the adoption of textbooks
(115), Gibson includes in his report on education reform the transition of training for teachers
from pre-war, government controlled ‘normal schools’ to independent, liberal arts colleges (111).
This allows teachers to be trained outside of government influence. In these ways, despite a
strong bureaucratic system, there is still freedom at the localized levels to divert any nationalist
trends by the government toward indoctrination.
However, as noted by Fackler, there was a proposal in 2013 by a government-appointed
committee to put mayors in charge of local school districts, which is seen as an attempt for more
political control over education (1). Therefore, it’s clear that the fight between the government
and local education leaders remains.

Analysis and Discussion
Based on the research, I affirm that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that are
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taught, history curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to contribute
to the rise of nationalism within a country, in particular because the majority of research I found
relating to nationalism and education centered around or included such phenomena. Each of
these goals can be traced to relate to the definitions of nationalism, such as promotion of the
nation, love and loyalty to the state and its culture, particularly as a unified group, and the
subordination or loyalty of the individual to the nation.
In Germany, during the pre-war this is seen heavily such as in its use of education for
consolidation of the nation, as well as the definition of a united people, called to sacrifice for the
greater good of their nation/state. Mythologized histories and state control played a prominent
role in this, as did the formation of national identity, such as the consolidation of das Volk. In
addition, the definition of a united Aryan people allowed for the formation of an in-group to
accommodate policies directed by the state against the outgroup, chiefly the Jewish people.
In the post-war however, it appears that Germany has taken strong efforts to diverge from
their past. The goals for education are aimed more largely at the individual, rather than the state.
Although there are traces of a national identity formulated around shame for the past, this is not
directed toward the promotion of the German nation over a particular group or other state. Their
history, focusing largely and democratically on the darker aspects of their past, as well as on a
more globalized history, functions in a similar way. The inclusion of heroes of resistance does
suggest a past slightly formulated for the construction of an identity or path forward, as Chun
suggests history is able to do. However, being that these heroes of resistance are noted to resist
against the government/state itself (Buruma 186, 188), it does not seem that this reflects
nationalist calls for state elevation or promotion. Finally, the decentralized formation of
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education, which perpetuates democratic policy, suggests the maintenance of curricula outside of
political influence, which prevents ideological indoctrination or state bias.
During the pre-war era in Japan, the primary themes related to nationalism can be seen
similarly to Germany, in the unification of national identity and people in order to strengthen the
state. Despite the existence of slightly alternate views, due to a general consensus of national
superiority, this form of nationalism prevailed as the central goal of Japan’s education. National
identity, as mentioned, consisted most significantly on a unified set of values which promoted
subordination of individual to the collective, most notably, the emperor as the supreme symbol of
the state. History was mythologized in order to promote a divine legacy which ought to be
preserved and could be used to assert superiority. Finally, centralized control allowed for
indoctrination of students with these ethics and goals of the state, with increased emphasis on
militarization over time.
In current society, the government goals have been reworded, but there is a continued
desire among government and Ministry officials for education to foster proper respect and
patriotism in regard to the country. The reinstatement of Moral Education as an official school
subject seems to be in line with this goal, as it is obviously and increasingly reminiscent of the
earlier prescribed national ethics, although not in any way to the level of post-1932
ultra-nationalism. The officially curated history as outlined in textbooks promotes this as well, as
does the centralized control of education which controls policy, curricula, and textbook
screenings. Heavily censored textbooks, as well as other elements such as exams and controversy
surrounding certain subjects, contribute to the lack of discussion about darker elements of
Japan’s past and construct a sensitized view of Japan’s legacy, which could be seen as an attempt
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to cultivate national pride and loyalty. This focus could also be considered to inhibit an increased
understanding of Japan’s place within the global community. However, the centralized control of
matters of curricula is checked by local efforts, largely the Teachers Union and other educators,
as many outside the government view the goals of education differently, and wish to promote the
cultivation of the individual, not the state. Many also desire to work toward the promotion of
peace, which although often more critical in its approach to history and more globalized in its
nature, could be seen as an attempt to form a national identity that puts Japan’s role as a victim
over it’s simultaneous role as an aggressor. In addition, private institutions are said to be exempt
from the heavy control of the Ministry. Therefore, nationalist policies are continuously countered
by efforts to circumvent them as actors in Japan play tug-of-war between those seeking first and
foremost promotion of the country and those fearful for a return to Japan’s nationalist,
militaristic past.

Suggestions for further research
In conducting this research, there were several questions I came across that could be looked into.
In his paper, Fukuoka notes a wide variety of sources that contribute to the formation of
collective memory, how people remember their nations history. Although many people assert
textbooks to be the primary mark of a nation’s understanding of history, this is not so. In my
research I focused primarily on matters related to formation education, and as such, was only
able to examine this influence on memory. As such, research that steers more in the direction of
history could examine these various memory devices such as television, music, news sources,
and more, particularly in Japan, where I found many tendencies to overemphasize the danger of
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a single, not widely adopted textbook to the collective, national memory. In addition, my
research concentrated only on undergraduate levels of education for simplicity, so examinations
into upper levels of schooling would be helpful.
In relation to questions of identity, research based on the conference surrounding
globalized history could be done to trace the extent to which German history is based around
forming a unified European identity, particularly in relation to the European Union, rather than a
national or global identity. Finally, citizenship education for refugees could be studied to see to
what extent similar ideas of European identity, or even the earlier mentioned “consciousness” of
being a German are taught (Shibata 122).

Conclusion
In conclusion, in my research I posed the question: How has education contributed to the
formation or prevention of nationalism in Germany and Japan? In examining this, after defining
the standard ideas of nationalism, I applied these definitions to pre-war and post-war Germany
and Japan. Ultimately, I concluded that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that
are taught, history curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to
contribute to the rise of nationalism within a country. Based on this, I postulate that while
Germany has made definite strides to steer away from nationalism in its response to these areas,
Japan has at the government level, struggled to move from pre-war trends, despite meeting some
success at the local level. In coming to understand this, we can not only thoughtfully support
efforts to diverge from nationalism at the international level, but hopefully we can as individuals,
engage with the structures local to us in order to do the same.
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